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Abstract
This paper studies the possibility of cooperation based on players pref-
erences. Consider the following innitely repeated game, similar to Ghosh
and Ray (1996). At each stage, uncountable numbers of players are randomly
matched without information about their partners past actions and play a
prisoners dilemma game. The players have the option to continue their re-
lationship, and they all have the same discount factor. Also, they have two
possible types: high ability player (H ) or low ability player (L). H can pro-
duce better outcomes for its partner as well as for itself than L can. I look for
an equilibrium that is robust against both pair-wise deviation and individual
deviation and call such equilibrium a social equilibrium. I show that in this
setting, long term cooperative behavior can arise in a social equilibrium. H
wants to match and play only with another H because an HH match produces
better outcomes for H than an HL match. So H would break a match with L
to increase the possibility of meeting another H, and thus H would not play
any cooperative action with L. L knows this intention of H and realizes that L
can only cooperate with another L. Consequently, both HH and LL matches
are endowed with a scarcity value. This scarcity value is utilized by players
to sustain cooperative relationships. Therefore, in a social equilibrium, whole
players can play long term cooperative actions because of their preferences for
their partnerstypes.
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1 Introduction
The motivation of the present paper comes from studies in the area of Folk Theorem.
Classical literature in folk theorem, developed by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986),
Kandori (1992), and Ellison (1994), showed that a long-term cooperative relationship
in a prisoners dilemma is possible without any legal enforcement, assuming that
playerspast actions a¤ect their future payo¤s. Based on a di¤erent assumption that
playerspast actions might not necessarily a¤ect their future payo¤s because they
can change their partners in a large population, Ghosh and Ray (1996), hereinafter
referred to as GR, maintained that a long-term cooperative relationship is still possible
according to the structure of their model. However, GRs model is sound only when
there exist a signicantly large proportion of players who have zero discount factors
and thus would not play any cooperative action. Therefore, GRs model can be
considered as a partial population cooperation model. As a follow-up of GR, the
present study is motivated to seek whole population cooperation possibilities in a
prisoners dilemma game assuming that playerspast actions might not a¤ect their
future payo¤s.
In this study, the whole population cooperation takes place based on two assump-
tions. First, every player is assumed to be either a high-ability player (H-player)
or a low-ability player (L-player) according to her production ability. An H-player
is dened as a player who can produce better outcomes for her partner as well as
for herself than an L-player. Second, players in a common pair have the option to
continue their relationships if they both wish. In this setting, I look for a long-term
cooperative behavior that is robust against both pair-wise deviation and individual
deviation as GR intended in their study.
The present study shows that such a cooperative behavior can happen in equilib-
rium because of playerspreferences for their partnerstypes. An H-player wants to
match and play only with another H-player because a high-ability partner produces
better outcomes than a low-ability partner. So, when an H-player meets an L-player,
the H-player would break the relationship with the L-player in order to increase the
possibility to meet another H-player. Thus, an H-player would not play any coopera-
tive action with an L-player. Since an L-player is aware of H-playersintentions, she
realizes that she can only cooperate with another L-player. Consequently, two kinds
of matches, the H-H match and the L-L match, are endowed with a scarcity value.
Players can use this scarcity value to sustain their cooperative relationship. There-
fore, the result shows that in equilibrium a long-term cooperative relationship among
the whole population is possible based on playerspreferences for their partners.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to detailed description
of the model. Section 3 introduces the concept of a social equilibrium. Section 4
presents the results of this study, including the folk theorem of this model.
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2 The Model
The following setting of the model comes from GR. A continuum of players are
randomly matched in pairs and bilaterally play an innitely repeated stage game
with an option to break up their relationship. Each stage of the game consists of
two substages. At the rst substage, players in a common pair play a prisoners
dilemma game with an action set [0; ~a]  R. At the second substage, after watching
the actions chosen before, players decide whether to break up their relationship. Only
when both players in a common pair decide to maintain their relationship, can they
play the stage game between themselves at the next stage. If one of the players in
a common pair breaks up the relationship, then both in the pair go into the pool of
unmatched players and would be randomly matched with other players in the pool.
At the next stage, all players bilaterally repeat this stage game.
The present model introduces new features into the setting of GR. All players
have the same discount factor , but they have their own types. Each player is either
an H-player or an L-player. An H-player has higher abilities to produce an outcome
than an L-player does. Based on this ability di¤erence, the present model reects the
situation in which a partner of an H-player can benet from the high ability of the
H-player by sharing the produced outcome. Therefore, it is assumed that a players
payo¤ depends on her partners type as well as on her own type and also depends
on her partners and her actions so that when other things being equal, a player
gets a better payo¤when she cooperates with an H-player than when she
cooperates with an L-player.
The payo¤ functions of the players are as follows. For any I; J 2 fH;Lg, the
function IJ : [0; ~a]2  ! R denotes a payo¤ function of I-type when she works
with J-type. For example, let a; a0 2 [0; ~a], then HL(a; a0) denotes the payo¤ to
an H-player when she works with an L-player under her action a and her partners
action a0. Here, the playersactions a and a0 can be referred to as cooperation levels.
Then, in order to reect the prisoners dilemma setting, it is assumed that for each
a; a0 2 [0; ~a], if a > 0, then IJ(0; a0) > IJ(a; a0). In addition, the payo¤ under zero
actions, IJ(0; 0), is normalized to zero.
In this study, three assumptions about the payo¤ functions from GRs model are
adopted and adapted. First, the payo¤ function IJ is assumed to be continuous,
and the function JJ(a; a) is assumed to be strictly increasing in a. This assumption
is used for the sake of simplicity. Second, there exists a 2 (0; ~a] such that JJ(a; a) >
(1   )JJ(0; a). Third, given any aL 2 [0; ~a], there exists a 2 (0; ~a] such that
HH(a; a) +(1   )HL(a; aL) > (1   )HL(0; aL) where  is the proportion of
H-players in the pool of unmatched players. If the second or the third assumption
does not hold, then players might not have any incentive to play a positive action.
Therefore, the latter two assumptions are used to exclude a trivial case in which
players have no incentive to cooperate with their partners and prefer to play zero
actions.
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Regarding information, a player has limited information about types and actions.
A player is informed only of her own type. However, if her partner plays a positive
action, she can gure out her partners type by comparing the outcomes drawn from
her action and her partners action. This is because, other things being equal, the
cooperative action performed by a high ability partner brings out a better outcome
than the action performed by a low ability partner. Note that a player cannot gure
out her partners type if her partner plays a zero action because of the normalization
of the payo¤s. In addition, a player knows only her own actions and her partners
actions from the beginning, but they do not know the actions taken by others. A
players personal history is dened as the record of her type, the types of her partners
who have played positive actions, and all the actions taken by her partners and her
from the beginning. Therefore, a pure strategy of a player is a possible mapping from
her personal histories either to the set of the actions [0; ~a] for the rst substages or
to the set of the breakup decisions for the second substages.
3 Social Equilibrium
In this study, our interest is restricted to social norms and steady states like in the
study of GR. A social norm is a prole of pure strategies such that players of the same
type use the same pure strategy. A state is steady if the proportion of H-players in
the pool of unmatched players, , is constant over time1. Moreover, our study focuses
on the cooperation possibility based on playerspreferences for the high ability of an
H-player. So, we rule out the cases in which a player prefers betraying an H-player
partner rather than cooperating with the H-player partner because of a possible huge
payo¤when she betrays the H-player partner. In addition, our equilibrium is required
to satisfy two criteria: Individual incentive constraintand Bilateral rationality,
which were proposed by GR. These two criteria require an equilibrium to be proof
against individual deviation and pair-wise deviation, respectively2.
These two criteria are applied to ve possible phases. First, these are applied to
the phase in which two H-players are matched into a pair and they are aware of their
partnerstypes. In this phase, H-players solve the following optimization problem;
1For information about the feasibility of a constant , please refer to GR. Here, another interpre-
tation of a constant  is presented. If we assume that the relationship will be exogenously broken
up with a probability  > 0 regardless of playersbreakup decisions, then we can easily show that
a constant  is feasible. In addition, given any  > 0 and any positive number " > 0, we can nd
an exogenous breakup probability  > 0 such that " >  and  makes  a constant proportion of
H-players in the pool over time. Therefore, the steady state in which  > 0 and  = 0 can be
interpreted as the limit of the exogenous breakup cases.
2In GR, individual incentive constraint is dened as a social norm under which, given that other
players follow the norm, no player has an incentive to deviate from the norm. In addition, bilateral
rationality is dened as a social norm under which, given that other players follow the norm, no
matched pair of players who have followed the norm can improve their payo¤s by making a joint
change from the norm. For more information about these criteria, please refer to GR.
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given 0  xH  maxa2[0;~a]fHH(a;a)1   HH(0; a)g,
V FH (xH)  max
a2[0;~a]
HH(a; a)
1   (1)
s:t:
HH(a; a)
1    HH(0; a) + xH (2)
where xH denotes a present value to an H-player when she is in the pool of un-
matched players. Given a present value to an H-player, this optimization problem
yields the highest possible cooperation level, which, therefore, satises bilateral ratio-
nality, among all the cooperation levels that satisfy individual incentive constraint.
Second, based on the optimization problem above, the two criteria are applied to
the phase for an H-player when she is newly matched and thus she does not know
her partners type; given xH and aSL 2 [0; ~a],
V SH (xH ; a
S
L)  max
a2[0;~a]
fHH(a; a) + V FH (xH)g+ (1  )fHL(a; aSL) + xHg (3)
s:t: fHH(a; a) + V FH (xH)g+ (1  )fHL(a; aSL) + xHg (4)
 fHH(0; a) + xHg+ (1  )fHL(0; aSL) + xHg
where aSL denotes an action of an L-player when she is newly matched.
Similarly, the two criteria are applied to the phases for L-players. Third, two L-
players who are certain that their partners are L-players solve the following problem;
given 0  xL  maxa2[0;~a]fLL(a;a)1   LL(0; a)g,
V FL (xL)  max
a2[0;~a]
LL(a; a)
1   (5)
s:t:
LL(a; a)
1    LL(0; a) + xL (6)
where xL denotes a present value to an L-player when she is in the pool of unmatched
players.
Fourth, an L-player who is newly matched solves the following problem; given xL
and aSH 2 [0; ~a],
V SL (xL; a
S
H)  max
a2[0;~a]
fLH(a; aSH) + xLg+ (1  )fLL(a; a) + V FL (xL)g (7)
s:t: fLH(a; aSH) + xLg+ (1  )fLL(a; a) + V FL (xL)g (8)
 fLH(0; aSH) + xLg+ (1  )fLL(0; a) + xLg
where aSH denotes an action of an H-player when she is newly matched.
Finally, the two criteria are applied to the phase in which an H-player and an
L-player are matched into a pair and they are aware of their partners types. In
equilibrium, players could have long-term cooperative relationships in the previous
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four phases only if they cannot achieve cooperation in this phase. So, given present
values in the pool of unmatched players, we need to show that every cooperation level
that satises individual incentive constraint does not give an H-player or an L-player
a greater payo¤ than their present values in the pool. This condition is formalized at
the condition 9 in Denition 1.
Now, we are ready to dene our equilibrium, which we call a Social Equilibrium.
This social equilibrium is adopted and adapted from GR.
Denition 1 A social equilibrium is a collection of actions (aFH ; a
S
H ; a
F
L ; a
S
L) and pay-
o¤s (V FH ; V
S
H ; V
F
L ; V
S
L ) such that
1. given V SH , a
F
H solves (1) subject to (2);
2. given V SH and a
S
L, a
S
H solves (3) subject to (4);
3. given V SL , a
F
L solves (5) subject to (6);
4. given V SL and a
S
H , a
S
L solves (7) subject to (8);
5. the payo¤ V FH equals the maximum value V
F
H (V
S
H );
6. the payo¤ V SH equals the maximum value V
S
H (V
S
H ; a
S
L);
7. the payo¤ V FL equals the maximum value V
F
L (V
S
L );
8. the payo¤ V SL equals the maximum value V
S
L (V
S
L ; a
S
H);
and for all a0; a00 2 [0; ~a],
9. if
HL(a
0; a00)
1    HL(0; a
00) + V SH , then V
S
H 
HL(a
0; a00)
1   or (9)
if
LH(a
00; a0)
1    LH(0; a
0) + V SL , then V
S
L 
LH(a
00; a0)
1   . (10)
4 Results
In this study, the results are similar to GRs in respect to the factors that can inuence
the level of cooperation in equilibrium. In both studies, cooperation is enhanced when
players nd their proper matches or when the discount factor goes up. However, while
GRs results apply to partial population only, the following results show that a long-
term cooperative relationship among the whole population is possible. The rst result
shows that there exists a social equilibrium. Like in GR, special assumptions on payo¤
functions are used for the existence of the equilibrium. Note that only Proposition 1
uses these special assumptions.
Assumption 1. For each J 2 fH;Lg, the payo¤ function JJ(a; a) is strictly con-
cave, the function JJ(a; 0) is concave, and the function JJ(0; a) is convex3.
3For the information about this assumption, please refer to GR.
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Assumption 2. The left-hand partial derivatives of HL(a1; a2) and LH(a1; a2)
with respect to the rst argument a1 are continuous in the second argument a2.
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that the optimization functions V SH (; ) and V SL (; )
and the optimizers in these functions are continuous in their arguments. This prop-
erty of continuity serves as a stepping-stone for the existence of a xed point in the
optimization problems above.
Assumption 3. For each IJ 2 fHL;LHg, the payo¤ function IJ(a1; a2) is concave
in a1 and convex in a2, and for a1 > 0, IJ(0; a2)  IJ(a1; a2)  IJ(0; a02)
 IJ(a1; a02) if a2 > a02.
Assumption 3 implies that in the di¤erent-type matches, i:e:, the H-L matches, the
payo¤IJ(a1; a2) decreases with her own action a1 at an increasing rate and increases
with her partners action a2 at an increasing rate. In addition, when a1 is positive,
the payo¤ di¤erence IJ(0; a2) IJ(a1; a2) decreases in a2. This assumption is used
for the sake of simplicity.
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Proposition 1 presents a su¢ cient condition for
the existence of a social equilibrium. Like in GR, the notations below are used to
simplify the su¢ cient condition. First, denote by a1H and a
1
L the maximizers of the
functions HH(a; a)  (1 )HH(0; a) and LL(a; a)  (1 )LL(0; a), respectively.
Next, let a2H and a
2
L denote the maximum values of a s.t.
fHH(0; a)  HH(a; a)g+ (1  )fHL(0; ~a)  HL(a; ~a)g
 fHH(0; a1H)  HH(a1H ; a1H)g and
fLH(0; ~a)  LH(a; ~a)g+ (1  )fLL(0; a)  LL(a; a)g
 (1  )fLL(0; a1L)  LL(a1L; a1L)g, respectively.
Finally, let a3H and a
3
L denote the maximizers of the strictly concave functions HH(a; a)
+(1  )HL(a; ~a) and LH(a; ~a) +(1  )LL(a; a), respectively.
Here is a su¢ cient condition4 for the existence of a xed point in the aforemen-
tioned optimization problems.
Condition E If a3H  a2H , then
HH(a
3
H ; a
3
H) + (1  )HL(a3H ; ~a) (11)
 ( + 1

)HH(a
1
H ; a
1
H) + (1    
1

)HH(0; a
1
H)g.
If a3H > a
2
H , then
HH(0; a
2
H) + (1  )HL(0; ~a)  HH(a1H ; a1H)  (1  )HH(0; a1H). (12)
4For an intuitive description of this condition, please refer to GR.
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If a3L  a2L, then
LH(a
3
L; ~a) + (1  )LL(a3L; a3L) (13)
 (1   + 1

)LL(a
1
L; a
1
L) + (  
1

)LL(0; a
1
L)g.
If a3L > a
2
L, then
LH(0; ~a) + (1  )LL(0; a2L)  LL(a1L; a1L)  (1  )LL(0; a1L). (14)
To sustain a social equilibrium, a xed point in the optimization problems above
has to satisfy the condition 9 in Denition 1 in which one of the types has no incentive
to cooperate with the other type. If the ability di¤erence between an H-player and an
L-player is wide enough, then the H-player would have no incentive to cooperate with
the L-player, and therefore, the xed point would satisfy the condition 9 in Denition
1. Denition 2 below provides the level of the ability di¤erence in which an H-player
has no incentive to cooperate with an L-player.
Denition 2 Dene a4H as the value of a such that (1   )LH(0; a) = (1  
)LL(a
1
L; a
1
L). The ability di¤erence between an H-player and an L-player is said
to be wide enough if HH(a1H ; a
1
H)  (1  + )HL(a4H ; ~a) whenever a4H exists.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, a social equilibrium exists if Condi-
tion E holds and the ability di¤erence between an H-player and an L-player is wide
enough.
Proof. See Appendix.
Examples with specic payo¤ functions can be found in GR. The payo¤ functions
from GR, however, have to be adapted for the L-players. In GR, one of two types
has no incentive to play any positive action. The zero action by this type lowers a
present value to the other type in the pool of unmatched players, and this lowered
present value in turn makes an ongoing cooperative relationship more valuable. As
a result, although an one-period payo¤ from betrayal is high, the type who has an
incentive to play a positive action can sustain a long-term cooperative relationship
among themselves. In the present model, on the other hand, when H-players are
newly matched with L-players, they play positive cooperative actions aSH . Since the
H-playersactions aSH signicantly improve present values to L-players in the pool, if
one-period payo¤s to L-players when they betray other L-players are as high as those
in GR, then L-players would prefer betraying their partners more than cooperating
with them. Therefore, the payo¤ functions from GR need to be modied so that
L-players can sustain long-term cooperative relationships among themselves.
The second result describes cooperation levels in each phase in equilibrium. There
are two possible phases in which a player can play di¤erent levels of cooperation.
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First, a player can play a cooperative action when she knows that her partner is of
the same type as herself. Second, a player can play another cooperative action when
she is newly matched, and thus, does not know her partners type. Proposition 2
below shows that a player plays a higher cooperative action in the rst phase than
in the second phase except that she achieves the same level of cooperation when
she plays full cooperative actions in both phases. According to the interpretation
of GR, Proposition 2 characterizes a social equilibrium into a testing phaseand a
cooperation phase.In the testing phase, the players are cautious,and as a result,
they have less to achieve. If they are conrmed that they are matched with the same
type of players as themselves, then they move into the cooperation phase where they
can play at greater cooperation levels.
Proposition 2 In a social equilibrium, aFJ  aSJ where J 2 fH;Lg with strict in-
equality holding whenever aFJ < ~a.
Proof. Consider an H-player case. If aFH = ~a, then it is trivial. Let a
F
H < ~a in
equilibrium. By way of contradiction, suppose that aFH  aSH . Then, we have that
HH(0; a
S
H) + V
S
H  HH(a
S
H ;a
S
H)
1  by the constraint (2). Then,
(1  )fHH(0; aSH)  HH(aSH ; aSH)g  fHH(aSH ; aSH)  (1  )V SHg
 fHH(aFH ; aFH)  (1  )V SHg = (1  )(V FH   V SH )
> (1  )(V FH   V SH ) +
1  

(1  )fHL(aSH ; aSL)  HL(0; aSL)g
where the fact HL(aSH ; a
S
L)   HL(0; aSL) < 0 is used at the last inequality. This
contradicts (4). Therefore, we have aFH > a
S
H . Similarly, we can show a
F
L  aSL with
strict inequality holding whenever aFL < ~a.
The nal result goes one step further from GRs. In their paper, as players become
innitely patient, the cooperation level in equilibrium approaches full cooperation
once players nd their proper matches. In the present model, Proposition 3 below
states that when players are su¢ ciently patient, they play the maximal cooperation
level in equilibrium right after they check that they are matched with the same type
partners as themselves, which is the folk theorem of this study.
Proposition 3 (Folk Theorem) There exists a discount factor  < 1 such that
for any  2 [; 1), aFH = aFL = ~a in a social equilibrium under , whenever the social
equilibrium exists.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose not. Then, for any  < 1, there exists
1 > 0   such that under 0, there exists a social equilibrium with aFH < ~a or
aFL < ~a. First, consider the case in which for any  < 1, there exists 1 > 
0   such
that under 0, there exists a social equilibrium with aFH < ~a. In the social equilibrium
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under the discount factor 0, let V SH be a present value to an H-player in the pool of
unmatched players. Then, according to the constraint (2), we have that
HH(~a; ~a)
1  0 < HH(0; ~a) + 
0V SH . (15)
In addition, we have that
V SH 
1
0
fHH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1  0   HH(0; a
1
H)g (16)
where a1H is a maximizer of HH(a; a)  (1  )HH(0; a). Note that since 10fHH(~a;~a)1 0
 HH(0; ~a)g < V SH  10f
HH(a
1
H ;a
1
H)
1 0  HH(0; a1H)g, we have that a1H < ~a. By com-
bining (15) with (16), we have that
HH(~a; ~a)
1  0 < HH(0; ~a) +
HH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1  0   HH(0; a
1
H)
() 1
1  0fHH(~a; ~a)  HH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)g < HH(0; ~a)  HH(0; a1H). (17)
However, since the inequality (17) holds for any  < 1 and thus for any 1 > 0  ,
(17) is contradiction. Similarly, we can show that it is contradiction that for any
 < 1, there exists 1 > 0   such that under 0, there exists a social equilibrium
with aFL < ~a. This completes the proof.
Distinguished from GRs model, the present model is signicant in two aspects.
First, in GR, if there exists a social equilibrium, it must be unique, because one type
always prefers to play a zero action and the other type has only one best response
to the zero action. In the present model, however, there could be multiple social
equilibria, because players can play di¤erent levels of initial actions (aSH ; a
S
L). Since
each type has the best response to the initial action of the other type, there could
be multiple social equilibria elicited from multiple initial actions. Second, in GR,
a change in , the proportion of non-myopic players of unmatched players, directly
inuences the payo¤s. An increase in  results in an increase in the present values
when players are in the unmatched pool and also results in a non-increase in the
payo¤s to non-myopic players when they nd non-myopic partners. In the present
model, however, due to the possible existence of multiple equilibria, a change in ,
the proportion of H-players in the pool of unmatched players, does not have a clear
e¤ect on the payo¤s (V FH ; V
S
H ; V
F
L ; V
S
L ). This is because the impact from a change in
 could be diluted with the inuence from a change in equilibria.
In conclusion, a long-term cooperative behavior that is robust to both pair-wise
deviation and individual deviation is possible among the whole population in equi-
librium. Regarding the cooperative behavior, after players play a lower cooperation
in the testing phase, they move on to higher cooperation in the cooperation phase. If
players are patient enough, both H-players and L-players can achieve full cooperation
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once they nd their proper matches. Therefore, based on playerspreferences for their
partnerstypes, a long-term cooperative relationship among the whole population is
possible in equilibrium.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider (1) subject to (2). Note that V FH (xH) is
continuous and non-increasing in xH . Also, we have that V FH (xH)  xH > 0 because
of (2). Given xH 2 [0; 1f
HH(a
1
H ;a
1
H)
1    HH(0; a1H)g] and aSL 2 [0; ~a], dene
aSH(xH ; a
S
L) 2 arg max
a2[0;~a]
fHH(a; a) + V FH (xH)g+ (1  )fHL(a; aSL) + xHg
s:t: fHH(0; a) + xHg+ (1  )fHL(0; aSL) + xHg
 fHH(a; a) + V FH (xH)g+ (1  )fHL(a; aSL) + xHg.
Let a2H(xH ; a
S
L) be the maximum value of a such that
fHH(0; a) + xHg+ (1  )fHL(0; aSL) + xHg
 fHH(a; a) + V FH (xH)g+ (1  )fHL(a; aSL) + xHg
() fHH(0; a)  HH(a; a)g+ (1  )fHL(0; aSL)  HL(a; aSL)g
 fV FH (xH)  xHg.
Then, a2H(xH ; a
S
L) > 0 since V
F
H (xH)   xH > 0. Also, a2H(xH ; aSL) is continuous in
xH and aSL because 1) fHH(0; a)  HH(a; a)g +(1  )fHL(0; aSL)  HL(a; aSL)g
is strictly increasing in a and continuous in a and aSL; and 2) fV FH (xH)   xHg
is continuous in xH . In addition, let a3H(a
S
L) denote the maximizer of the strictly
concave function HH(a; a) + (1   )HL(a; aSL). Then a3H(aSL) > 0 because given
any aSL 2 [0; ~a], there exists a > 0 s.t. HH(a; a) +(1   )HL(a; aSL) > (1  
)HL(0; a
S
L). The function HL(a1; a2) is concave in a1, and therefore, its left-
hand partial derivative with respect to a1,
@HL(a1 0;a2)
@a1
, is well-dened on (0; ~a]2.
According to Assumption 2, @HL(a1 0;a2)
@a1
is continuous in a2. Also, the function
HH(a; a) is strictly concave in a. Therefore, a3H(a
S
L) is continuous in a
S
L. Note that
aSH(xH ; a
S
L) = minfa2H(xH ; aSL); a3H(aSL)g. Since a2H(xH ; aSL) and a3H(aSL) are positive
and continuous in xH and aSL, so is a
S
H(xH ; a
S
L). Dene
H(xH ; a
S
L)  max
a2[0;~a]
fHH(a; a) + V FH (xH)g+ (1  )fHL(a; aSL) + xHg
s:t: fHH(0; a)  HH(a; a)g+ (1  )fHL(0; aSL)  HL(a; aSL)g
 fV FH (xH)  xHg.
ThenH(xH ; aSL) = fHH(aSH(xH ; aSL); aSH(xH ; aSL)) +V FH (xH)g+(1 )fHL(aSH(xH ;
aSL); a
S
L) +xHg, and H(xH ; aSL) is continuous in xH and aSL. Similarly, we can dene
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aSL(xL; a
S
H) and L(xL; a
S
H) for an L-player and show that a
S
L(xL; a
S
H) and L(xL; a
S
H)
are continuous in xL and aSH .
Let
V^ SH  max
a2(0;~a]
fHH(a; a)
1     HH(0; a)g and
V^ SL  max
a2(0;~a]
fLL(a; a)
1     LL(0; a)g.
Then V^ SH and V^
S
L exist and are positive because JJ(a; a) > (1 )JJ(0; a) for some
a > 0 where J 2 fH;Lg. If
max
aSL
fH(V^ SH ; aSL)g  V^ SH and (18)
max
aSH
fL(V^ SL ; aSH)g  V^ SL , (19)
then by using the values aSH(xH ; a
S
L), a
S
L(xL; a
S
H),minfH(xH ; aSL); V^ SHg, andminfL(xL;
aSH); V^
S
L g, we can construct a continuous function from [0; ~a]2  [0; V^ SH ]  [0; V^ SL ] to
[0; ~a]2  [0; V^ SH ]  [0; V^ SL ] such that a xed point of the function, whose existence is
guaranteed by Brouwers Fixed Point Theorem, solves (3) subject to (4) and solves
(7) subject to (8). Therefore, to complete the proof, we should check that (18) and
(19) are equivalent to Condition E and also should show that if the ability di¤erence
between an H-player and an L-player is wide enough, then the xed point satises
the condition 9 in Denition 1.
First, check that (18) and (19) are equivalent to Condition E. Note that
V^ SH =
1

fHH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1     HH(0; a
1
H)g.
In addition, note that H(xH ; ~a)  H(xH ; aSL) for every aSL 2 [0; ~a] since HL(0; a2)
 HL(a1; a2)  HL(0; a02)  HL(a1; a02) if a2 > a02. Therefore, if a3H(~a)  a2H(V^ SH ; ~a),
i:e:, a3H  a2H , then
max
aSL
fH(V^ SH ; aSL)g  V^ SH () (V^ SH ; ~a)  V^ SH
() HH(a3H ; a3H) + (1  )HL(a3H ; ~a)
+
HH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1   + 
(1  )

fHH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1     HH(0; a
1
H)g
 1

fHH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1     HH(0; a
1
H)g,
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which is equivalent to (11). If a3H > a
2
H , then by the denition of a
2
H ,
H(V^
S
H ; ~a)  V^ SH
() HH(0; a2H) + (1  )HL(0; ~a)
+
1   + 
1   HH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)  (1  )HH(0; a1H)
 1

fHH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1     HH(0; a
1
H)g,
which is equivalent to (12). Similarly, we can show that (19) is equivalent to (13) and
(14). Therefore, (11), (12), (13), and (14) are a su¢ cient condition for the existence
of a xed point.
Finally, we need to show that the xed point satises (9) and (10). Let V SH and
V SL be parts of the xed point such that V
S
H and V
S
L satisfy the respective conditions
6 and 8 in Denition 1. Then, we have V SH (V
S
H ; a
S
L) = V
S
H and V
S
L (V
S
L ; a
S
H) = V
S
L for
some aSL and a
S
H . Note that V
F
H (xH) and V
F
L (xL) are non-increasing in xH and xL,
respectively, and thus, V FH (x
0
H)  V FH (V^ SH ) and V FL (x0L)  V FL (V^ SL ) for any x0H and
x0L. By (3) and (7), we have that
V SH  V FH (V^ SH ) + (1  )V SH () V SH 

1   + 
HH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)
1   (20)
and V SL  V SL + (1  )V FL (V^ SL ) () V SL 
(1  )
1  
LL(a
1
L; a
1
L)
1   . (21)
Suppose that a0; a00 2 [0; ~a] satisfy the premises of (9) and (10). Then,
LH(0; a
0)
1   
LH(a
00; a0)
1    LH(0; a
0) + V SL
=) LH(0; a
0)
1    
(1  )
1  
LL(a
1
L; a
1
L)
1   (22)
where (21) is used at the inequality (22). Since the function LH(0; a) is convex,
from (22), we can nd that there exists a4H and that a
0  a4H . Since ~a  a00, we have
that HL(a
4
H ;~a)
1   HL(a
0;a00)
1  . Since the ability di¤erence between an H-player and an
L-player is wide enough,

1   + HH(a
1
H ; a
1
H)  HL(a4H ; ~a)
=) V SH 
HL(a
4
H ; ~a)
1   
HL(a
0; a00)
1  
where the second inequality follows from (20). Since a0; a00 2 [0; ~a] are arbitrary, the
xed point satises the condition 9 in Denition 1. This completes the proof.///
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